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tante, una cierta tendencia a minusvalorar la contribución de los autores historicistas, 
así como a sobredimensionar los aspectos más radicales que se hallarían implícitos en 
sus enfoques. Esta consideración acerca del historicismo, particularmente en lo que 
concierne a la aportación kuhniana, parece, por una parte, poco fundada teniendo en 
cuenta la obra completa de Kuhn, y, por otra, difícilmente conciliable con otras obser-
vaciones hechas por el propio Moulines. En relación con lo primero, ha de señalarse 
que, al contrario de lo que el autor afirma (cf. p. 92), en muchas de sus obras a partir 
de los años setenta, Kuhn se esforzó por explicar el modo en el que las teorías incon-
mensurables podían compararse a partir de sus conceptos compartidos. Si bien ha de 
reconocerse que el tratamiento informal que caracteriza la aproximación de Kuhn a 
este problema puede resultar insatisfactorio, el problema no consistiría tanto en una 
falta de explicitación como en una falta de precisión. En esas mismas obras, Kuhn se 
mantiene en un enfoque epistemológico-semántico al margen del sociologismo y 
abiertamente contrario al relativismo. Por otra parte, el propio Moulines nos recuerda 
que Stegmüller, uno de los fundadores del estructuralismo, se propone como uno de 
sus objetivos fundamentales el de “'reconstruir racionalmente' las tesis de Kuhn” (p. 
135). Las tesis kuhnianas han sido recogidas en muchos de los trabajos de orientación 
modelística, incluida la obra programática estructuralista: An Architectonic for Science. The 
Structuralist Program (1987). Dichas tesis, por tanto, han inspirado algo más que una 
suerte de relativismo sociologista kamikaze-postmoderno. 
 Al margen de las pequeñas fisuras que puedan encontrarse en el equilibrio valorati-
vo de la obra, ésta posee cualidades difícilmente aunables en el terreno filosófico y que 
convierten su lectura en una auténtica delicia. El rigor en el tratamiento analítico va 
aquí de la mano con la amplitud en la contextualización de las ideas, la profundidad en 
la elucidación de los problemas y la síntesis clara y amena. Tiene además el raro méri-
to, tan costoso como a menudo desapercibido, de hacer que lo difícil parezca fácil.  
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Does the existence of the phenomenon of meaning need a particular kind of ‘tran-
scendental’, ‘non-natural’, ‘hermeneutic’, or ‘intentional’ agents to exist in the world? 
Or can it emerge out of simple ‘game-like’ interactions between ‘low-level’, ‘natural’, 
‘dull’ beings? Bryan Skyrms’ recent book on Signals provides a strong argument in fa-
vour of the second option: the emergence of a system of behaviours that work as sig-
nals with conventional meaning, helping to coordinate the (either competitive or co-
operative) interactions between a group of agents, needs not something like the exist-
ence of ‘original intentionality’, neither the existence of ‘rationality’ in the most philo-
sophical sense of the word. Starting from David Lewis’ classical theory on conven-
tions (which was framed in the traditional rational-choice framework of the first gen-
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erations of game theorists), Skyrms develops a new approach based on the theory of 
evolutionary games, learning theory, the study of networks, and computer simulations, 
in order to proof that relatively sophisticated systems of signals can emerge out of the 
interaction of agents in which a minimal capacity of computation is assumed. 
 The structure of this short book is divided in fourteen brief (not self-contained, 
but relatively self-cogent) chapters that progressively introduce the reader into more 
and more complex models, from the most simple and classic signalling games of Lew-
is, to evolutionary models, learning models, the possibility of deception and invention, 
networks and, lastly, the possibility of signals’ compositionality. Though not a book 
for the general reader, its logical, technical or mathematical demands are relatively low, 
and so it can be read by many philosophers or scientists interested in the topic, though 
it is sometimes too clumsy about what are the reasons why certain problems the au-
thor discusses are philosophically or technically relevant. In this sense, a greater effort 
to make the connection with some discussions on philosophy, epistemology, game 
theory, etc., would have been welcome. Probably the collection in which OUP has in-
cluded the book, composed of relatively short volumes, has forced the author to make 
a choice between introducing as many ideas as possible, or being more philosophically 
explicit. 
 From a philosophical point of view, perhaps there are other two questions the 
book deals with which are particularly interesting, and can generate a more prolific 
discussion within the academia in the future. First, it is Skyrms vision of epistemology 
as the study of the flow of information. Though the book does not really make clear 
in what sense this idea is central to the philosophical project the book belongs to, or 
what is the real contribution the book makes to the development of that idea, I think 
that book’s claim that game-theoretic interactions create information (p. 39) is extraor-
dinarily important, and can have relevant consequences for a lot of either classical or 
newer philosophical problems. I think that greater effort must be put into the aspects 
of Skyrms’ theory that would serve to apply it to particular problems in epistemology 
(like the reliability of beliefs or of the procedures for acquiring them, the nature of the 
factors that produce the distinction between true and false information, etc.), but this 
is surely something we will see in the future.  
 The second interesting point is Skyrms’ virtuosistic confutation of Kant’s claim 
that lying is immoral because it could not be a ‘universalizable’ maxim. Skyrms shows 
(p. 80 ff.) that in some cases, some games produce a result in which the information 
that is provided is systematically deceptive (at least in some senses or partially), but 
that in those games, the agents are collectively better off by following the strategy in 
which they send this false information, than by abiding to an ‘always-say-the-truth’ 
strategy. Perhaps the example is not very realistic, nor ‘deception’ is exactly under-
stood as ‘lying’ in it, but it serves at least as a logical counterexample to the Kantian 
argument, which should hence be defended on premises different from its apparent 
universal formal validity. 
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 Lastly, one sceptical point about the book. One is left with the impression that, if 
signalling were as easy and spontaneous as the different models considered in the 
book suggest, we lack, hence, an explanation of why something as complex as our 
human languages has required the existence of a species as intelligent and cognitively 
sophisticated as ours. Perhaps other animals (or bacteria, or chips) would be able of 
developing by networked evolutionary gambling something comparable to the vo-
cabulary and grammar of an English textbook for six year old children... but they hap-
pened to lack other cognitive and emotional abilities that make that system a toy 
which is fun to play with. 
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